### 2ac

1. We get to weigh case

a. Moots the 1ac – eliminates 9 minutes of aff offense and makes it impossible to be aff

b. Implementation education – allowing us to weigh the case is key to test the alternative against different advocacies

#### C. Switch side debate uniquely solves critical thinking through deliberation that solves oppression.

Lundberg, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill communications professor, 2010

[Christian, Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century by Allan Louden, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” <http://books.google.com/books?id=ntHxX_9J7gYC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=complex%20world&f=false>, p.311-3, accessed 8-8-12, TAP]

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that is presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate in speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech – as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on a debate. if democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry’s capacity can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988, 63, 154). Debate provides an indispensable form of education in the modern articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, 140) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid.). Larkin’s study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instruction/no instruction and debate topic…that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned…students in the Instructional [debate] group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so…These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in [debate]…These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students’ self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing…the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin’s study substantiates Thomas Worthen and Gaylen Pack’s (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthen and Pack’s framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today’s student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical-thinking skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded, and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens who can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive and to deal with systemic threats that risk our collective extinction. Democratic societies face a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention, and new possibilities for great power conflicts; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization, including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world. Given the challenge of perfecting our collective political skill, and in drawing on the best of our collective creative intelligence, it is incumbent on us to both to make the case for and, more importantly, to do concrete work to realize and expanded commitment to debate at colleges and universities.

2. Permutation – endorse the strategy of the aff as well as the strategy of the neg – solves all their offense – any risk that the aff strategy is good is a net benefit.

#### 3. Most of our claims are contingent – they have to answer each one specifically. Sherry, you have the ability to pick which parts of the aff you affirm – some ideas in the aff are consistent with the approach of the neg – that makes it possible to endorse both

Price, University of Minnesota anthropology professor, and Reus-Smit, Monash Unversity, 1998

[Richard and Christian, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism” <http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/PriceReusSmithCriticalInternatlTheoryConstructivism.pdf>, p.271-2, accessed 1-6-13, TAP]

One of the central departures of critical international theory from positivism¶ is the view that we cannot escape the interpretive moment. As George¶ (1994: 24) argues, ‘the world is always an interpreted “thing”, and it is always interpreted in conditions of disagreement and conflict, to one degree¶ or another’. For this reason, ‘there can be no common body of observational¶ or tested data that we can turn to for a neutral, objective knowledge of the¶ world. There can be no ultimate knowledge, for example, that actually¶ corresponds to reality per se.’ This proposition has been endorsed wholeheartedly¶ by constructivists, who are at pains to deny the possibility of¶ making ‘Big-T’ Truth claims about the world and studiously avoid¶ attributing such status to their findings. This having been said, after¶ undertaking sustained empirical analyses of aspects of world politics¶ constructivists do make ‘small-t’ truth claims about the subjects they have¶ investigated. That is, they claim to have arrived at logical and empirically¶ plausible interpretations of actions, events or processes, and they appeal to¶ the weight of evidence to sustain such claims. While admitting that their¶ claims are always contingent and partial interpretations of a complex world,¶ Price (1995, 1997) claims that his genealogy provides the best account to¶ date to make sense of anomalies surrounding the use of chemical weapons,¶ and Reus-Smit (1997) claims that a culturalist perspective offers the best¶ explanation of institutional differences between historical societies of¶ states. Do such claims contradict the interpretive ethos of critical international¶ theory? For two reasons, we argue that they do not. First, the interpretive¶ ethos of critical international theory is driven, in large measure, by a¶ normative rejection of totalizing discourses, of general theoretical frameworks¶ that privilege certain perspectives over others. One searches constructivist¶ scholarship in vain, though, for such discourses. With the possible¶ exception of Wendt’s problematic flirtation with general systemic theory and¶ professed commitment to ‘science’, constructivist research is at its best when¶ and because it is question driven, with self-consciously contingent claims¶ made specifically in relation to particular phenomena, at a particular time,¶ based on particular evidence, and always open to alternative interpretations.¶ Second, the rejection of totalizing discourses based on ‘big-T’ Truth claims¶ does not foreclose the possibility, or even the inevitability, of making¶ ‘small-t’ truth claims. In fact, we would argue that as soon as one observes¶ and interacts in the world such claims are unavoidable, either as a person¶ engaged in everyday life or as a scholar. As Nietzsche pointed out long ago,¶ we cannot help putting forth truth claims about the world. The individual¶ who does not cannot act, and the genuinely unhypocritical relativist who¶ cannot struggles for something to say and write. In short, if constructivists¶ are not advancing totalizing discourses, and if making ‘small-t’ truth claims¶ is inevitable if one is to talk about how the world works, then it is no more¶ likely that constructivism per se violates the interpretive ethos of critical¶ international theory than does critical theory itself.

4. If we win any of our particular claims are good, then vote aff – don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good – the only language necessary to solve is legal discourse

5. They don’t solve the case – great power war from drones and war in the SCS is inevitable – even if the alt solves it only solves in the long term – the impacts escalate in the short term – have a low threshold for evaluating the claims of the case because they have conceded them

#### 6. The alt is vague – that’s a reason to reject the team because it makes them a moving target that we can’t test to determine if it is true, and vague alts fail.

Farber, City University of New York Brooklyn College political science professor, 9-13-12

[Samuel, “Occupy Wall Street and the Art of Demanding” <http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/11507-occupy-wall-street-and-the-art-of-demanding>, accessed 9-15-12, TAP]

The OWS reluctance to formulate demands might have been beneficial initially in that it might have created a more welcoming atmosphere to newly radicalized people. But as movements develop and mature, they need to state more clearly what they stands for and not only what they stand against. Movements need to develop some kind of theory to guide their actions, not as an obscure, technical body of thought only accessible to the select few, but as the clearest possible ideas about the nature of the enemy and of the movement. Movements must address the problems they are likely to confront as they go from point A – where they are – to point B – where they want to be.

#### 7. Good is good enough – method focus never results in action.

Fearon, Stanford Political Science Professor, and Wendt, Ohio State IR Professor, 2002

[James and Alexander, Handbook of International Relations, p. 68]

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological 'ism'. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical, and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

#### 8. The absolutism of their alternative results in tunnel vision – evaluate consequences.

Isaac, Indiana University James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life director, Spring 2002

(Jeffrey C. “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol. 49 Issue 2, p32)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond moral- ity. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean con- science of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerless- ness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### 9. Turn – alt doesn’t stop global drone use – only the plan creates a framework for use that prevents state-based repression.

Boyle, La Salle University political science assistant professor, 2013

[Michael, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare” http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf, p.28-9, accessed 9-8-13, TAP]

A final, and crucial, step towards mitigating the strategic consequences of drones ¶ would be to develop internationally recognized standards and norms for their use ¶ and sale. It is not realistic to suggest that the US stop using its drones altogether, ¶ or to assume that other countries will accept a moratorium on buying and using ¶ drones. The genie is out of the bottle: drones will be a fact of life for years to ¶ come. What remains to be done is to ensure that their use and sale are transparent, regulated and consistent with internationally recognized human rights ¶ standards. The Obama administration has already begun to show some awareness ¶ that drones are dangerous if placed in the wrong hands. A recent New York Times¶ report revealed that the Obama administration began to develop a secret drones ¶ ‘rulebook’ to govern their use if Mitt Romney were to be elected president.157¶ The same logic operates on the international level. Lethal drones will eventually be in the hands of those who will use them with fewer scruples than President Obama has. Without a set of internationally recognized standards or norms ¶ governing their sale and use, drones will proliferate without control, be misused ¶ by governments and non-state actors, and become an instrument of repression ¶ for the strong. One remedy might be an international convention on the sale and ¶ use of drones which could establish guidelines and norms for their use, perhaps ¶ along the lines of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) ¶ treaty, which attempted to spell out rules on the use of incendiary devices and ¶ fragment-based weapons.158 While enforcement of these guidelines and adherence ¶ to rules on their use will be imperfect and marked by derogations, exceptions and ¶ violations, the presence of a convention may reinforce norms against the flagrant ¶ misuse of drones and induce more restraint in their use than might otherwise be ¶ seen. Similarly, a UN investigatory body on drones would help to hold states ¶ accountable for their use of drones and begin to build a gradual consensus on the ¶ types of activities for which drones can, and cannot, be used.159 As the progenitor ¶ and leading user of drone technology, the US now has an opportunity to show ¶ leadership in developing an international legal architecture which might avert ¶ some of the worst consequences of their use.

#### 10. Turn – the alt makes authoritarianism and oppression inevitable.

Boyle, La Salle University political science assistant professor, 2013

[Michael, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare” http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf, p.25-6, accessed 9-8-13, TAP]

Fourth, there is a distinct danger that the world will divide into two camps: ¶ developed states in possession of drone technology, and weak states and rebel¶ movements that lack them. States with recurring separatist or insurgent problems ¶ may begin to police their restive territories through drone strikes, essentially ¶ containing the problem in a fixed geographical region and engaging in a largely ¶ punitive policy against them. One could easily imagine that China, for example, ¶ might resort to drone strikes in Uighur provinces in order to keep potential threats ¶ from emerging, or that Russia could use drones to strike at separatist movements ¶ in Chechnya or elsewhere. Such behaviour would not necessarily be confined to ¶ authoritarian governments; it is equally possible that Israel might use drones to ¶ police Gaza and the West Bank, thus reducing the vulnerability of Israeli soldiers ¶ to Palestinian attacks on the ground. The extent to which Israel might be willing ¶ to use drones in combat and surveillance was revealed in its November 2012 attack ¶ on Gaza. Israel allegedly used a drone to assassinate the Hamas leader Ahmed Jabari ¶ and employed a number of armed drones for strikes in a way that was described ¶ as ‘unprecedented’ by senior Israeli officials.148 It is not hard to imagine Israel ¶ concluding that drones over Gaza were the best way to deal with the problem ¶ of Hamas, even if their use left the Palestinian population subject to constant, ¶ unnerving surveillance. All of the consequences of such a sharp division between ¶ the haves and have-nots with drone technology is hard to assess, but one possibility is that governments with secessionist movements might be less willing to ¶ negotiate and grant concessions if drones allowed them to police their internal ¶ enemies with ruthless efficiency and ‘manage’ the problem at low cost. The result ¶ might be a situation where such conflicts are contained but not resolved, while ¶ citizens in developed states grow increasingly indifferent to the suffering of those ¶ making secessionist or even national liberation claims, including just ones, upon ¶ them.

**11. Our use of nuclear fear and discourse is necessary to check extinction- it provides the consciousness to ensure peace in the face of nuclear war and worse**

JAH Futterman, former US Nuclear Weapons Scientist, 1994

[“Obscenity and Peace: Meditations on the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Work,” <http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html> ]

But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.[16] In other words, when the peace movement tells the world that we need to treat each other more kindly, I and my colleagues stand behind it (like Malcolm X stood behind Martin Luther King, Jr.) saying, "Or else." We provide the peace movement with a needed sense of urgency that it might otherwise lack.

#### 12. Learning policy making discourse is the only way to challenge the dogmatic assumptions of elites – their interpretation of radical acts is too rigid and absolute – using the state can solve oppression.

David E. McClean, New School University Professor, and Society for the Study of Africana Philosophy President, 2001, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

13. State action can fight racism.

Jensen, Texas University Journalism Professor, Nowar Collective Founder, 2005

[Robert, The Heart of Whiteness, p.78-87]

I'm all for diversity and its institutional manifestation, multiculturalism. But we should be concerned about the way in which talk of diversity and multiculturalism has proceeded. After more than a decade of university teaching and political work, it is clear to me that a certain kind of diversity-talk actually can impede our understanding of oppression by encouraging us to focus on the cultural and individual, rather than on the political and structural. Instead of focusing on diversity, we should focus on power. The fundamental frame for pursuing analyses of issues around race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and class should be not cultural but political, not individual but structural. Instead of talking about diversity in race, class, gender, and sexual orientation, we should critique white supremacy, economic inequality in capitalism, patriarchy, and heterosexism. We should talk about systems and structures of power, about ideologies of domination and subordination—and about the injuries done to those in subordinate groups, and the benefits and privileges that accrue to those in dominant groups. Here's an example of what I mean: A professor colleague, a middle-aged heterosexual white man, once told me that he thought his contribution to the world—his way of aiding progressive causes around diversity issues—came by expanding his own understanding of difference and then working to be the best person he could he. He said he felt no obligation to get involved in the larger world outside his world of family and friends, work and church. In the worlds in which he found himself personal and professional, he said he tried to be kind and caring to all, working to understand and celebrate difference and diversity. There are two obvious problems with his formulation, one concerning him as an individual and one concerning the larger world. First, without a connection to a political struggle, it is difficult for anyone to grow morally and politically. My own experience has taught me that it is when I am engaged in political activity with people across identity lines that I learn the most. It is in those spaces and those relationships that my own hidden prejudices and unexamined fears emerge, in situations in which comrades whom I trust call hold me accountable. Without that kind of engagement, I rarely get to levels of honesty with people that can propel me forward. The colleague in question saw himself as being, as the cliché goes, a sensitive new age guy, but from other sources I know that he continued to behave in sexist ways in the classroom. Because he had no connection to a feminist movement—or any other liberatory movement where women might observe his behavior and he in a position to hold him accountable— there was no systematic way for him to correct his sexist habits. His self-image as a liberated man was possible only because he made sure he wasn't in spaces where women could easily challenge him. The second problem is that if everyone with privilege — especially the levels of privilege this man had—decided that all they were obligated to do in the world was to be nice to the people around them and celebrate diversity, it is difficult to imagine progressive social change ever taking place. Yes, we all must change at the micro level, in our personal relationships, if the struggle for justice is to move forward. But struggle in the personal arena is not enough; it is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for change. Lots of white people could make significant progress toward eliminating all vestiges of racism in our own psyches—which would be a good thing—without it having any tangible effect on the systems and structures of power in which white supremacy is manifested. It would not change the ways in which we benefit from being white in that system. It doesn't mean we shouldn't "work on" ourselves, only that working on ourselves is not enough. It is possible to not be racist (in the individual sense of not perpetrating overtly racist acts) and yet at the same time fail to be antiracist (in the political sense of resisting a racist system). Being not-racist is not enough. To he a fully moral person, one must find some way to be antiracist as we Because white people benefit from living in a white-supremacist society, there is an added obligation for us to struggle against the injustice of that system. The same argument holds in other realms as well. Men can be successful at not being sexist (in the sense of treating women as equals and refraining from sexist behaviors) but fail at being antisexist if we do nothing to acknowledge the misogynistic sys- tern in which we live and try to intervene where possible to change that system. The same can be said about straight people who are relatively free of antigay prejudice but do nothing to challenge heterosexism, or about economically privileged people who do nothing to confront the injustice of the economic system, or about U.S. citizens who don't seek to exploit people from other places but do nothing to confront the violence of the U.S. empire abroad. We need a political and structural, rather than a cultural and individual, framework. Of course we should not ignore differences in cultural practices, and individuals should work to change themselves. But celebrating cultural differences and focusing on one's own behavior are inadequate to the task in front of us. I have been clearer on that since September 11, 2001 after which George W. Bush kept repeating "Islam is a religion of peace," reminding Americans that as we march off on wars of domination we should respect the religion of the people we are killing. Across the United States after 9/11, people were saying, "I have to learn more about Islam." My response was, 'Yes but you also have to learn more about American foreign policy and militarism?' Religious and cultural differences can be extremely important in understanding political struggles, but those differences do not by themselves explain politics. Too many non- Muslim Americans were too quick to believe that they could understand the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq by reading a book about Islam. It is an improvement when an insular people become curious about something outside their own experience. But when politicians can so easily invoke diversity and multiculturalism in the service of the empire, something has gone dangerously off the rails. It is strange enough when an antifeminist administration can make the claim that its invasion of Afghanistan was motivated in part by a feminist desire to free the women of that country, but even stranger when some segments of the feminist movement celebrated the invasion and, hence, participated in the celebration of militarism. When feminism can be a cover for a war of empire, we're in trouble. Let me return to the title of his chapter and, once again, make sure I am clear about its meaning. I grew up in North Dakota, a very homogeneous world— very white, very middle class, very insular. Since then I have been lucky to live in more diverse places, where 1 have made friends who don't look exactly like me. I have learned, and continue to learn, a lot about other people and other cultures. I continue to learn not to make the assumption that everyone else sees the world as I do, or wants the same things I do, or interprets my words and actions the same way I do. These are lessons I was glad to learn, and struggle to relearn almost daily. Diversity is a good thing, and learning how to deal with diversity is a good thing, too. The project of helping people achieve what is sometimes called 'cultural competence—especially those of us who provide services to a diverse population, such as teachers or health-care workers—is important. But diversity training and cultural competence, while valuable in their own right for their own purposes, are not the same thing as political resistance to unjust systems and structures of power. Diversity and cultural awareness are necessary to progressive social change but not sufficient to achieve it. If we allow diversity to become the mantra for issues around white supremacy and white privilege) we are in for trouble. One of the things 1 fear most about using diversity as the framework is how easy it is for some of the less pleasant truths about this society and its affluence to drop out of our conversations. Diversity is fine, so long as it doesn't seriously challenge the desires of the dominant society. Diversity is fine, so long as the distribution of power and wealth remains relatively constant. Diversity is fine, so long as it stays in a cultural box. How do we dismantle white supremacy? So, if it's about politics not culture, it's reasonable to expect something beyond vague exhortations and be more specific about what kind of politics I'm talking about. What is my plan? What are my solutions? I will resist the temptation to offer a list of anions needed, not only because I don't feel qualified to proclaim them but also because solutions are always contextual; they depend on the specific problems we face in the world in a giver time and place. There is no easy template for putting together a successful pro gram for changing unjust policies or systems. From the past we can reasonably observe that all successful movements for justice include public education and organizing— helping people develop an analysis and then creating channels for action based on that analysis. Beyond that, there arc specific lessons from specific movements that can be applied to specific situations, but to talk generally about what people should be doing is difficult. I have no blueprint for people to follow and no priority list of issues we white people should commit to. We live in a society in crisis on multiple fronts—political, economic, cultural, and ecological. There's no shortage of issues for those concerned with racial justice, and justice more broadly, to take up. Some of those struggles are aimed directly at white supremacy, such as campaigns against racism in law enforcement and the police brutality that follows from that racism. Some in the black community have taken up the project of reparations for the descendants of African slaves. There are organizations engaged in such work; anyone can join them. Beyond those kinds of activities, in any social justice movement there are ways white people can challenge white supremacy. Members of environmental organizations can press to make sure that issues of environmental racism way in which poor communities that typically are non-white so often become dumping grounds for toxic waste on the agenda for their group. Labor organizers can work to make sure that unions, many of which have a racist history, are open in meaningful ways to non-white workers. People concerned with the state of public education can put high on their groups' list of priorities the struggle to equalize resources for all students and end de f educational apartheid. So, there are times when white people can find a place in organizations run by non-white people, fitting ourselves into the agendas that they have set. We can lend our energies and resources to the campaigns of others. We can leverage our privileges and resources to the benefit of such projects. We also can make sure racial-justice politics are on the agenda in predominantly white groups. We can seek ways to connect across racial lines in a society that for many of us is still largely segregated in housing and social patterns. We can look for ways in the all- white settings many of us find ourselves in to keep race visible, knowing that in such settings it is easy to forget about where and how to use our energies and resources arc always complex. For example, at various times I have participated in efforts to defend affirmative action, not because I think affirmative action is the solution to the problem of white supremacy at the University of Texas or in the United States, but because it was an issue on which many non-white people had decided to focus, it opened a space in which one could talk about racism, and there was a way for me to contribute as a member of the university community. As events in the world have unfolded since 9/11, my focus increasingly has shifted to the complexity of race in antiwar and antiempire activism, which always has an anti- racist component given the way in which U.S. wars and economic policies target and disadvantage non-white people around the world. I also have for a number of years worked in the feminist antipornography movement, which includes an analysis not only of the misogyny of mass-marketed pornography but also the blatant white supremacy of some pornographic genres that draw on ugly racist stereotypes. If I were to attempt any statement about solutions, it is that progressive social change requires one to go forward with passion and a sense of commitment in what one is fighting for, while at the same time being realistic about just how much one really understands a complex world. Those two things often are in conflict. To find the courage and energy it takes to stand against power, one has to believe deeply in the cause. There are few traditional rewards of status or material wealth to be gained in movements for progressive social change, and the more rad ical the movement, the fewer the rewards. So, the motivation for most people is passion and a belief that we are right. But at the same time, we have to retain an understanding that while we may he right in some sense about the quest for justice, our speciflc analysis at any given moment may be slightly off, or maybe even drastically wrong. If we are not open to influences that can help us see that, if we do not hold onto intellectual and moral humility, we are more likely to make mistakes, possibly quite serious mistakes, at some point. This is especially true u people in the more privileged sectors of society. This is especially true of white people in the United States. It certainly has been true in my life.

#### 14. Using the state can fight oppression against indigenous people.

Grande, Connecticut College education associate professor, 2007

[Sandy, *Critical Pedagogy: Where are we now?* By Peter McLaren, “Red Lake Woebegone: Pedagogy, Decolonization, and the Critical Project” <http://books.google.com/books?id=M97YKJdkJbcC&q=sandy+grande#v=onepage&q=grammar%20of%20empire&f=false>, p.330, accessed 2-6-13, TAP]

Audre Lorde’s essay, The Master’s Tools Will Not Dismantle the Master’s House, is one of the most quoted essays in academic history and, I would also venture to say, one that needs rethinking. While it is self-evident that indigenous knowledge is essential to the process of decolonization, I would also argue that the Master’s tools are necessary. Otherwise, to take Audre Lorde seriously means to create a dichotomy between the tools of the colonizer and those of the colonized. Such a dichotomy leaves the indigenous scholar to grapple with a kind of “Sophie’s Choice” moment where one feels compelled to choose between retaining their integrity (identity) as a Native scholar by employing only indigenous knowledge or to “sell out” and employ the frames of Western knowledge. What does it mean for indigenous scholars to engage Western knowledge? Does it signify a final submission to the siren’s song, seducing us into the colonialist abyss with promises of empowerment? Or is it the necessary first step in reclaiming and decolonizing an intellectual space – an inquiry room – of our own? Such questions provoke beyond the bounds of academic exercise, suggesting instead the need for an academic exorcism.¶ The demon to be purged is the specter of colonialism. As indigenous scholars, we live within, against, and outside of its constant company, witnessing its various manifestations as it shape-shifts its way into everything from research and public policy to textbooks and classrooms. Thus, the colonial tax of Native scholars not only requires a renegotiation of personal identity but also an analysis of how whole nations get trans- or (dis)figured when articulated through Western frames of knowing. As Edward Said observes, “institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” all support to the “Western discourse” (Said, 1985, p.2). In other words, is it possible to engage the grammar of empire without replicating its effects?

#### 15. Using the state can fight sexism.

Catherine MacKinnon, University of Michigan Law School Elizabeth A. Long Law Professor, 2005, “Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws, p. 42-3

There is a legitimate question, though, about the relation between law and the power that produces it, and the degree to which change in one produces change in the other. Whatever we know about how change is made, we do know that no change in one produces no change in the other. Women's experience makes us suspicious of making women's legal exclusion and marginalization and invisibility into a radical virtue, even as the antistate position usually stops short of opposing pornography, which the state is clearly for. Women's everyday lives make us suspicious of the view that rights, especially equality rights, do not matter, even as many who take this position have rights while women in general do not.27 Our lives make us suspicious of abdicating the state-in favor of what? those bastions of sensitivity and receptivity to women, the media and organized labor? Besides, what does it mean to abdicate a society you are excluded from, besides further exclusion? It does not stop affecting you when you stop trying to affect it. Surely one of the most effective strategies for maintaining a system of dominance is to convince those who seek to end it that the tools of dominance must be left in the hands of the dominant. Women need institutional support for equality, both because of and in spite of the fact that power in women's hands is different from power in men's hands. Getting power is not the same as transforming it, but how are we supposed to transform it if we cannot get it? How can it be changed if it is authoritatively defined in male terms and retained in male hands? I am tired of people who have power-whether they identify with it or not-telling women that we can only have power if we transform it. They might begin by insisting it be transformed in the hands of those who already have it. They might also explain how they plan to produce equality without institutional support, indeed while leaving in place present legal structures that enforce women's inequality. It's like telling women we should transform the state in the face of a law that deprives us of the right to vote. What are we supposed to do? Picket and hope they listen? Start a new state? Get the bomb? Why aren't any of these critics doing any of these things or their equivalent? I would also really like to hear their argument against the franchise. Not why it is limited; why its limits mean we should not fight for it and be able to vote at all. Maybe they think it is only symbolic. Whoever says law cannot make change so we should not try might explain why the law should be exempt in the struggle for social transformation. Some of us suspect that women, in particular, are being told that not much can be done with law because a lot can be. If law were to be made to work for women, the relation of law to life, as well as its content, might have to change in the process. As more women become lawyers and maybe the law starts to listen to women, perhaps the legal profession will decline in prestige and power. Maybe women using law will delegitimize law, and male supremacy-in its endless adaptability and ingenuity will have to find other guises for the dominance it currently exercises through law. This is not to urge a top-down model of change or to advocate merely inverting or reshuffling the demographics of existing structures of power, or to say that law alone solves anything. It is to say that putting power in the hands of the powerless can change power as well as the situation of the powerless. It is also to urge a confrontational engagement with existing institutions: one that refuses to let power off the hook. Integral to a larger political movement on all levels, this is a demand that law recognize that women live here, too. Every day of our lives.

#### 16. Debate is fundamentally a competition – the adversarial structures means there is no spillover.

Deborah Tannen, Ph.D., Georgetown University professor of linguistics and University Professor, 1998, “The Argument Culture,” p. 174

Another scholar who questions the usefulness of opposition as the sole path to truth is philosopher Janice Moulton. Philosophy, she shows, equates logical reasoning with the Adversary Paradigm, a matter of making claims and then trying to find, and argue against, counterexamples to that claim. The result is a debate between adversaries trying to defend their ideas against counterexamples and to come up with counterexamples that refute the opponent's ideas. In this paradigm, the best way to evaluate someone's work is to "subject it to the .. " strongest or most extreme opposition. But if you parry individual points-a negative and defensive enterprise-you never step back and actively imagine a world in which a different system of ideas could be true-a positive act. And you never ask how larger systems of thought relate to each other. According to Moulton, our devotion to the Adversary Paradigm has led us to misinterpret the type of argumentation that Socrates favored: We think of the Socratic method as systematically leading an opponent into admitting error. This is primarily a way of showing up an adversary as wrong. Moulton shows that the original Socratic method-the elenchus-was designed to convince others, to shake them out of their habitual mode of thought and lead them to new insight. Our version of the Socratic method-an adversarial public debate-is unlikely to result in opponents changing their minds. Someone who loses a debate usually attributes that loss to poor performance or to an adversary's unfair tactics.

#### 17. Ballot doesn’t change anything – the ballot says Vermont is good, but doesn’t change anything external this debate round. Each debate round is an isolated event.

#### 18. Performative politics is a private act that doesn’t challenge systemic oppression – two implications. A- all your offense on framework is solved by reading a book and B- you don’t solve your impacts, your speech act is an act of nihilism.

Nussbaum, University of Chicago law professor, 1999

[Martha, “The Professor of Parody” <http://www.akad.se/Nussbaum.pdf>, accessed 2-9-13, TAP]

The idea of gender as performance is Butler's most famous idea, and so it is worth pausing to scrutinize it more closely. She introduced the notion intuitively, in Gender Trouble, without invoking theoretical precedent. Later she denied that she was referring to quasi-theatrical performance, and associated her notion instead with Austin's account of speech acts in How to Do Things with Words. Austin's linguistic category of "performatives" is a category of linguistic utterances that function, in and of themselves, as actions rather than as assertions. When (in appropriate social circumstances) I say "I bet ten dollars," or "I'm sorry," or "I do" (in a marriage ceremony), or "I name this ship...," I am not reporting on a bet or an apology or a marriage or a naming ceremony, I am conducting one.¶ Butler's analogous claim about gender is not obvious, since the "performances" in question involve gesture, dress, movement, and action, as well as language. Austin's thesis, which is restricted to a rather technical analysis of a certain class of sentences, is in fact not especially helpful to Butler in developing her ideas. Indeed, though she vehemently repudiates readings of her work that associate her view with theater, thinking about the Living Theater's Austin.¶ Nor is Butler's treatment of Austin very plausible. She makes the bizarre claim that the fact that the marriage ceremony is one of dozens of examples of performatives in Austin's text suggests "that the heterosexualization of the social bond is the paradigmatic form for those speech acts which bring about what they name." Hardly. Marriage is no more paradigmatic for Austin than betting or ship-naming or promising or apologizing. He is interested in a formal feature of certain utterances, and we are given no reason to suppose that their content has any significance for his argument. It is usually a mistake to read earth-shaking significance into a philosopher's pedestrian choice of examples. Should we say that Aristotle's use of a low-fat diet to illustrate the practical syllogism suggests that chicken is at the heart of Aristotelian virtue? Or that Rawls's use of travel plans to illustrate practical reasoning shows that A Theory of Justice aims at giving us all a vacation?¶ Leaving these oddities to one side, Butler's point is presumably this: when we act and speak in a gendered way, we are not simply reporting on something that is already fixed in the world, we are actively constituting it, replicating it, and reinforcing it. By behaving as if there were male and female "natures," we co-create the social fiction that these natures exist. They are never there apart from our deeds; we are always making them be there. At the same time, by carrying out these performances in a slightly different manner, a parodic manner, we can perhaps unmake them just a little.¶ Thus the one place for agency in a world constrained by hierarchy is in the small opportunities we have to oppose gender roles every time they take shape. When I find myself doing femaleness, I can turn it around, poke fun at it, do it a little bit differently. Such reactive and parodic performances, in Butler's view, never destabilize the larger system. She doesn't envisage mass movements of resistance or campaigns for political reform; only personal acts carried out by a small number of knowing actors. Just as actors with a bad script can subvert it by delivering the bad lines oddly, so too with gender: the script remains bad, but the actors have a tiny bit of freedom. Thus we have the basis for what, in Excitable Speech, Butler calls "an ironic hopefulness."

#### 19. Being subversive has no intrinsic value absent pre-conceived norms – that flips subversion on its head.

Nussbaum, University of Chicago law professor, 1999

[Martha, “The Professor of Parody” <http://www.akad.se/Nussbaum.pdf>, accessed 2-9-13, TAP]

Butler departs in this regard from earlier social-constructionist feminists, all of whom used ideas such as non-hierarchy, equality, dignity, autonomy, and treating as an end rather than a means, to indicate a direction for actual politics. Still less is she willing to elaborate any positive normative notion. Indeed, it is clear that Butler, like Foucault, is adamantly opposed to normative notions such as human dignity, or treating humanity as an end, on the grounds that they are inherently dictatorial. In her view, we ought to wait to see what the political struggle itself throws up, rather than prescribe in advance to its participants. Universal normative notions, she says, "colonize under the sign of the same."¶ This idea of waiting to see what we get--in a word, this moral passivity--seems plausible in Butler because she tacitly assumes an audience of like-minded readers who agree (sort of) about what the bad things are--discrimination against gays and lesbians, the unequal and hierarchical treatment of women--and who even agree (sort of) about why they are bad (they subordinate some people to others, they deny people freedoms that they ought to have). But take that assumption away, and the absence of a normative dimension becomes a severe problem.¶ Try teaching Foucault at a contemporary law school, as I have, and you will quickly find that subversion takes many forms, not all of them congenial to Butler and her allies. As a perceptive libertarian student said to me, Why can't I use these ideas to resist the tax structure, or the antidiscrimination laws, or perhaps even to join the militias? Others, less fond of liberty, might engage in the subversive performances of making fun of feminist remarks in class, or ripping down the posters of the lesbian and gay law students' association. These things happen. They are parodic and subversive. Why, then, aren't they daring and good?¶ Well, there are good answers to those questions, but you won't find them in Foucault, or in Butler. Answering them requires discussing which liberties and opportunities human beings ought to have, and what it is for social institutions to treat human beings as ends rather than as means--in short, a normative theory of social justice and human dignity. It is one thing to say that we should be humble about our universal norms, and willing to learn from the experience of oppressed people. It is quite another thing to say that we don't need any norms at all. Foucault, unlike Butler, at least showed signs in his late work of grappling with this problem; and all his writing is animated by a fierce sense of the texture of social oppression and the harm that it does.¶ Come to think of it, justice, understood as a personal virtue, has exactly the structure of gender in the Butlerian analysis: it is not innate or "natural," it is produced by repeated performances (or as Aristotle said, we learn it by doing it), it shapes our inclinations and forces the repression of some of them. These ritual performances, and their associated repressions, are enforced by arrangements of social power, as children who won't share on the playground quickly discover. Moreover, the parodic subversion of justice is ubiquitous in politics, as in personal life. But there is an important difference. Generally we dislike these subversive performances, and we think that young people should be strongly discouraged from seeing norms of justice in such a cynical light. Butler cannot explain in any purely structural or procedural way why the subversion of gender norms is a social good while the subversion of justice norms is a social bad. Foucault, we should remember, cheered for the Ayatollah, and why not? That, too, was resistance, and there was indeed nothing in the text to tell us that that struggle was less worthy than a struggle for civil rights and civil liberties.¶ There is a void, then, at the heart of Butler's notion of politics. This void can look liberating, because the reader fills it implicitly with a normative theory of human equality or dignity. But let there be no mistake: for Butler, as for Foucault, subversion is subversion, and it can in principle go in any direction. Indeed, Butler's naively empty politics is especially dangerous for the very causes she holds dear. For every friend of Butler, eager to engage in subversive performances that proclaim the repressiveness of heterosexual gender norms, there are dozens who would like to engage in subversive performances that flout the norms of tax compliance, of non-discrimination, of decent treatment of one's fellow students. To such people we should say, you cannot simply resist as you please, for there are norms of fairness, decency, and dignity that entail that this is bad behavior. But then we have to articulate those norms--and this Butler refuses to do.

### More – State Good

#### The alt creates distancing from all of these solutions – voting neg let’s you wipe your hands clean instead of pursue actual change.

Johnston, Emory University, 2004

[Adrian, "The Cynic's Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief," http://www.scribd.com/doc/20244451/Johnston-a-The-Cynic-s-Fetish-Slavoj-Zizek-and-the-Dynamics-of-Belief, 1/1]

However, the absence of this type of Lacan-underwritten argument in Žižek’s socio- political thought indicates something important. Following Lacan, Žižek describes instances of the tactic of “lying in the guise of truth” and points to late-capitalist cynicism as a key example of this (here, cynically knowing the truth that “the System” is a vacuous sham produces no real change in behavior, no decision to stop acting “as if” this big Other is something with genuine substantiality).149 Žižek proclaims that, “the starting point of the critique of ideology has to be full acknowledgement of the fact that it is easily possible to lie in the guise of truth.”150 Although the Lacanian blurring of the boundary between theoretical thinking and practical action might very well be completely true, accepting it as true inevitably risks strengthening a convenient alibi—the creation of this alibi has long been a fait accompli for which Lacan alone could hardly be held responsible—for the worst sort of intellectualized avoidance of praxis. Academics can convincingly reassure themselves that their inaccessible, abstract musings, the publications of which are perused only by their tiny self-enclosed circle of “ivory tower” colleagues, aren’t irrelevant obscurities made possible by tacit complicity with a certain socio-economic status quo, but, rather, radical political interventions that promise sweeping changes of the predominating situation. If working on signifiers is the same as working in the streets, then why dirty one’s hands bothering with the latter? Consequently, if Žižek is to avoid allowing for a lapse into this comfortable academic illusion, an illusion for which Lacan could all too easily be perverted into offering rationalizing excuses, he must eventually stipulate a series of “naïve” extra-theoretical/extra- discursive actions (actions that will hopefully become acts after their enactment) as part of a coherent political platform for the embattled Left. His rejection of Marx’s positive prescriptive program as anachronistic is quite justified. But, in the wake of Žižek’s clearing of the ground for something New in politics, there is still much to be done. ¶ A brief remark by Žižek hints that, despite his somewhat pessimistic assessment of traditional Marxism, he basically agrees with the Marxist conviction that the demise of capitalism is an inevitable, unavoidable historical necessity—“The ultimate answer to the reproach that the radical Left proposals are utopian should thus be that, today, the true utopia is the belief that the present liberal-democratic capitalist consensus could go on indefinitely, without radical changes.”151 This hurling of the charge of utopianism back at those making it is quite convincing. In fact, any system proclaiming to be the embodiment of “the end of history” invariably appears to be utopian. Given what is known about the merciless march of history, believing that an ultimate, unsurpassable socio-political arrangement finally has arrived is almost impossible. So, one should indeed accept as true the unlikelihood of capitalism continuing on indefinitely; it must eventually give way to something else, even if this “x” cannot be envisioned clearly from within the present context. Nonetheless, Žižek’s own theorizing calls for a great deal of cautious reservation about the consequences of embracing this outlook as true, of falling into the trap of (to invoke this motif once more) lying in the guise of truth. Just as the combination of a purely negative, critical Marxism with the anticipation of the event of the act-miracle threatens to turn into an intellectual fetish (in the Žižekian ideological sense of something that renders the present reality bearable), so too might acknowledging the truth of capitalism’s finitude have the same unfortunate side-effect. One can tolerate today’s capitalism, because one knows that it cannot last forever; one can passively and patiently wait it out (at one point, Žižek identifies this anticipation of indeterminate change-yet-to-come as a disempowering lure, although he doesn’t explicitly acknowledge that his own work on ideology sometimes appears to be enthralled by just such a lure152). In both cases, the danger is that the very analyses developed by Žižek in his assault upon late-capitalist ideology might serve to facilitate the sustenance of the cynical distance whose underlying complicity with the present state of affairs he describes so well.

#### It is necessary to learn the language of the state- their form of opposition will always be transitory, getting co-opted by the government or society. It may be necessary but is not sufficient

Sullivan, the New Republic – editor, 1995 (Andrew, Virtually Normal, pg. 91-93)

Moreover, mere cultural redeployment in a free society is always subject to a cultural response; by expanding the possibility of queer expression, one also expands the possibility of normal expression. The techniques of ACT UP lend legitimacy to the techniques of Operation Rescue or radical fundamentalist politics or conservative talk-show hosts or viciously antihomosexual rap lyrics, or campus cynicism about “political correctness.” A politics which seeks only to show and not to persuade will only be as successful as its latest theatrical escapade, and will be as susceptible to the fashions of audiences as any other fad. Lesbians may be chic in 1993, but so long as cultural impact is one’s only weapon, a spate of family movies may dominate the culture a year later. If there is no legal residue, if there is no successful argument, if there is no actual persuasion, then the achievement will necessarily be transitory. It will not hold. It may even be reversed. Moreover, a cultural strategy as a political strategy is a dangerous one for a minority—and a small minority at that. Inevitably, the vast majority of the culture will be at best uninterested and at worst hostile to the whole endeavor. In a society where the market rules the culture, majorities win the culture wars. And in a society where the state, pace Foucault, actually does exist, where laws are passed according to rules by which the society operates, culture, in any case, is not enough. It may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. To achieve actual results, to end persecution of homosexuals in the military, to allow gay parents to keep their children, to provide basic education about homosexuality in high schools, to prevent murderers of homosexuals from getting lenient treatment, it is necessary to work through the very channels Foucault and his followers revile. It is necessary to conform to certain disciplines in order to reform them, necessary to speak a certain language before it can say something different, necessary to abandon the anarchy of random resistance if actual homosexuals are to be protected. As Michael Waizer has written of Foucault, he “stands nowhere and finds no reasons. Angrily he rattles the bars of the iron cage. But he has no plans or projects for turning the cage into something more like a human home.”

#### Knowing the policy details are critical to preventing abuses of state power where the state can justify killing anyone.

Guiora, University of Utah law professor, 2012

[Amos, Case Western Reserve Journal of Internal Law, vol 45, “Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All Out of Proportion” http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.13.Article.Guiora.pdf, p.254, accessed 9-15-13, TAP]

The U.S. drone policy raises profoundly important questions ¶ regarding the very nature of operational counterterrorism; its ¶ implementation reveals how morality and the rule of law are applied ¶ in an inherently ambiguous and amorphous paradigm. At present, the ¶ increasingly broader and more flexible definition of imminence, ¶ combined with a continually growing reliance on sleek new ¶ technology, is highly problematic and raises significant concerns about ¶ whether law and morality are truly serving as the necessary guiding ¶ force here. Law not only provides a state with the right to engage ¶ those who deliberately and randomly target innocent civilians—it also ¶ provides the essential guiding framework for the extent to which and ¶ manner by which the state can target and engage those individuals. ¶ Simply articulating an aggressive, tough on terrorism policy is not ¶ sufficient. Rather, the devil truly is in the details: the state must ¶ carefully define both the limits of force and how that limited force is ¶ to be applied. Such a carefully-defined limit and application of force is ¶ the essence of both morality in armed conflict and the rule of law. In ¶ contrast, deliberately operating in an open-ended paradigm with ¶ opaque parameters where state power is broadly defined and ¶ implemented opens the door, unnecessarily, to significant violations of ¶ morality and law.

Unlimited drone warfare where limits, targets, and goals are not ¶ narrowly defined creates an operational environment in which anyone ¶ killed, regardless of whether intended or unintended, is considered a ¶ legitimate target. This expanded articulation of legitimate target,¶ premised on significant expansion of tolerable collateral damage,¶ creates a slippery slope that inevitably results in the deaths of ¶ otherwise innocent individuals. The allure of modern technology has ¶ led many decision makers to minimize the need to carefully ¶ distinguish between the individuals who pose a threat and those who ¶ do not.